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ANTITRUST POWERS OF THE AEC
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer*
1. Introduction
The field of atomic energy presents legal problems which are
unique both in their nature and in their magnitude. Because of this
unique character, an historical approach to these problems may
be more fruitful than in those areas of the law which have a
greater precedential background. The singular nature of atomic
energy problems was rather dramatically stated in the first court
decision dealing with the problem of monopoly in atomic energy
when the court began its opinion by stating: "On August 6, 1945
some four square miles of a city were destroyed by a blast from a
bomb with the explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT."1
This article is directed toward an interpretation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 19542 as it concerns the authority of the AEC to
consider the antitrust implications incident to its licensing func-
tions. This inquiry will include an examination of the respective
responsibilities of the AEC and the Justice Department in meet-
ing the anti-competitive possibilities of the nuclear industry.
The article's approach will be twofold: (1) to sketch the general
background of the original monopoly provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 19463 and the changes in Atomic Energy Act of
1954, and (2) to compare the actual industrial and legal develop-
ments in this area since 1954 to those contemplated at the time
of passage of the 1954 Act in order to clarify some of the appar-
ent contradictions and to suggest a more effective legal approach
to these problems.
*Member of District of Columbia Bar, author of POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL (1961), Former Foreign Service Officer detailed to U.S. Atomic Energy
Agency Branch, Division of International Affairs.
1City of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 38 U.S.L.W. 2326 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1969).
242 U.S.C. § 2011-2281 (1954).
342 U.S.C. § 1807-1816 (1946).
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II. Historical Background
A. The 1946 Act and the Baruch Plan4
1. The International Context
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 became law on August 1,
1946. Because the international aspects of atomic energy regu-
lation were discussed in considerably greater depth during that
year than were the domestic aspects, reference to the in-
ternational proposals in many instances provides the clearest in-
sight in determining the intentions underlying the domestic legis-
lation. It is clear that, in broad outline, this domestic legislation
concerning control of atomic energy was coordinated with the
international proposals of the United States that had been sub-
mitted by Mr. Bernard Baruch to the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission in 1946.5
The United States' international proposals, known as the Ba-
ruch Plan, provided for a United Nations International Atomic
Development Authority (ADA) possessing quite comprehensive
powers. The authority of the ADA was to include ownership of
all reactors within member nations, except small research reac-
tors.6
The international proposals made it clear that all facilities for
production of electrical power from nuclear fuels would be the
property of the ADA.7 The United Nations Atomic Energy Com-
mission recommended that:
When the technique of the industrial utili-
zation of atomic power has been sufficiently
developed, the international agency within
the limits imposed by security should make
power available on an equitable basis to any
nation which may require it. 8
4B. BECHHOEFER, POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 41-82 (1961).5R. HEWLETT & 0. ANDERSON, JR., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION 408-409 (1962).
6U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 2702, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
ATOMIC ENERGY: GROWTH OF A POLICY at 44 (1946). The U.S. Government
planners indeed recognized that the ADA was only a few steps removed from World
Government. HEWLETT, note 5 supra. 2 LILIENTHAL, JOURNALS OF DAVID E.




This position was taken because the reactors would produce
plutonium or U-233, both of which are weapons materials consid-
ered "too dangerous for national exploitation." 9 All reactors10
would be owned by the Atomic Energy Commission until they
were turned over to the ADA.1" This ownership and control
arrangement provoked much criticism. Some thought that the
international proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which
was the basis of the Baruch Plan as well as the domestic legisla-
tion, were merely a public power scheme. 12
At one point in the United States' preparation of the Baruch
Plan, a licensing procedure, including certain safeguards, was
recommended to govern reactors capable of producing weapons
materials.13 This proposal was emphatically rejected. 14 The So-
viet suggestions for national ownership of reactors with in-
ternational safeguards were likewise rejected. Not until 1952 did
the United States acknowledge the possibility of an international
inspection system in lieu of international ownership of the pro-
duction facilities.' 5
2. Domestic Legislation
The original May-Johnson Bill' 6 and the later McMahon Bill,' 7
which developed into the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, caused
bitter debate on many topics, including the role of the military in
the control of atomic energy. However, the proper role of private
enterprise in the field of nuclear power was one issue that re-
ceived scant attention. The attention that it did receive led to the
development of rather ironic positions:
The McMahon Bill's provisions for con-
trolling materials had even more critical im-
plications. Within the realm of atomic energy,
the bill seemed to contradict some of the
91d. at 42.
'°At that time, there were only three plutonium production reactors at Hanford.
"See R. HEWLETT, supra, note 5, at 411.12See LILIENTHAL, supra note 6, at 40.
"See R. HEWLETT, supra, note 5, at 571.141d. at 575.
15See B. BECHHOEFER. supra note 4. at 61, and R. HEWLETT, supra note 5, at 571.
16S.1463, H.R. 4280, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).
17S. 1717, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).
May 19701
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most sacred traditions of the American eco-
nomic system. That the bill created a state
monopoly of atomic energy was unusual
enough. What was even more surprising was
that this did not seem to offend the con-
servative majority on the committee. New-
man later wrote of "the curious paradox that
conservative men, actuated by the most
profoundly conservative of all emotions, the
desire to achieve security, were forced to re-
sort to the radical expedient of state social-
ism."18
However, the free enterprise system was not without its advo-
cates:
The classic approach to free enterprise was
to minimize government controls. George E.
Folk, speaking for the National Association
of Manufacturers, could not reconcile Sec-
tions 4 and 5 with the stated purpose of the
bill "to insure the broadest possible ex-
ploitation of the field" of atomic energy. If
the bill was to fulfill the stated policy of
"strengthening free competition among pri-
vate enterprises so far as practicable," Folk
advocated that "the Commission should be
given only such authority as is, or may be-
come, conducive to public safety and public
health, with the least possible Government
interference."19
'
8See R. HEWLETT, supra note 5, at 493-494.
Section 5 made the commission sole owner of all source
materials after mining, all fissionable materials, all de-
vices for producing fissionable materials, and all atomic
weapons and weapon parts. The commission would ac-
quire all existing materials and devices from other Gov-
ernment agencies by transfer and from companies or
individuals by purchase or condemnation. There were
similar provisions in the May-Johnson bill, but S. 1717
went further in one respect. It declared that the commis-
sion should be "the exclusive producer of fissionable
materials, except production incident to research and
development activities." § 4 provided that existing pro-
duction contracts could continue in effect for not more
than one year, by which time the commission would
"arrange for the exclusive operation of the facilities em-
ployed in the manufacture of fissionable materials by
employees of the Commission.
[Vol. 3:2
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The early discussions of domestic legislation largely ignored
those areas beyond weapons and national security. Indeed, the
impetus to include legislative provisions concerning peaceful uses
of the atom arose from the efforts of the late James R. Newman20
long after the introduction of the original May-Johnson bill.2 1
Newman and Bryan Miller, a former attorney for the Office of
Price Administration, reasoned that:
The nation must ... develop atomic energy
not only for military security, but also to im-
prove public welfare, raise the standard of
living and strengthen free competition in pri-
vate enterprise.22
Moreover, the international negotiations provided the most
comprehensive treatment of the criteria to govern peaceful uses
of atomic energy.23 A Department of the State Memorandum
stated that:
"The Control of Dangerous" activities
should be carried out to the greatest extent
20Newman became an adviser to Senator McMahon late in October 1945.
21Indeed, the original suggestion for a preambular reference to peaceful uses came trom
Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counsel, of the State Department. See R. HEWLETT, supra
note 5, at 417.221d. at 441.23 0n June 14, 1946, in his initial speech to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr.
Baruch described the peaceful uses as follows:
Non-Dangerous Activities. A function of the Authority
should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic
energy.
Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of
research reators, the production of radioactive tracers by
means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tra-
cers, and to some extent the production of power should
be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable
licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured
materials, whose use we know also requires suitable
safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the
Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing
seems to have been overestimated by the public as a
safety measure.
Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activi-
ties. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn
between dangerous and non-dangerous activities, it is not
hard and fast. Provision should, therefore, be made to
assure constant reexamination of the questions and to
permit revision of the dividing line as changing condi-
tions and new discoveries may require.
Prospectus [Vol. 3:2
possible through direct operation by the Au-
thority. In its primary purpose of preventing
illicit use of fissionable materials, the Author-
ity can do this most certainly, most easily,
and with least interference with political in-
stitutions and industrial operations if it is the
sole manufacturer and owner of such
fissionable materials.
.. The Authority would thus have control of
the locations of primary production plants
and of any stockpiles of materials.... With
the sole right to manufacture in the Author-
ity's hands, "any attempt by others to carry
on such operations, or to seize the Author-
ity's facilities, whatever the announced in-
tent, would, of itself, constitute a grave viola-
tion." 24
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, like the Baruch Plan,
differentiated between dangerous uses which were prohibited and
Those present at the hearings seemed to agree that
extraordinary Government controls were justified, but
was it necessary to give the Government sole right of
ownership and to go so far as to require operation of the
plants by Government employees? That depended upon
how one interpreted the purposes of control. One aim
was to keep atomic energy firmly under the Govern-
ment's thumb until international controls were estab-
lished. A second was to prevent the atomic revolution
from swamping the free enterprise system. Virtually all
the controversy occurred in the second context.
Operations of Dangerous Activities. Any plant dealing
with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the poten-
tial of dangerous use must be not only subject to the
most rigorous and competent inspection by the Author-
ity, but its actual operation shall be under the manage-
ment, supervision, and control of the Authority. See
GROWTH OF A POLICY, supra, note 6 Appendix 13 at
145. [Emphasis added].
As a part of the background and evolution of a possible role for private power, it should
be pointed out that the first Chairman of the AEC was Mr. David Lilienthal, the head of
TVA, the chief proponent of public power. In 1947, when the AEC appointed its first
Industrial Advisory Committee to advise on increased participation by industry in atomic
energy, Mr. Lilienthal was initially shocked by the designation of John C. Parker, a
representative of the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies, and Walker Cisler ol
Detroit Edison as members of the Committee on the ground that private power had no
interest or concern with nuclear power. JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, supra note
6, at 245.
24U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUs. No. 2702, THE SECOND UNITED STATES MEMO-
RANDUM: DETAILED FUNCTIONS & POWERS OF THE PROPOSED ATOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT AUTHORITY at 64 (1946).
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peaceful uses which could be licensed. While section 4 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited private ownership of reac-
tors, 25 section 7 of the Act provided procedures for the licensing
of "utilization of atomic energy" (e.g. isotope utilization, irradia-
tion), although not for its private production or utilization in
reactors.26 Section 7(b) made a finding by the Commission that a
peaceful "manufacture, production, export or use" had a "prac-
tical value" a prerequisite to the issuance of a license.2 7 After the
procedural prerequisites of section 7(b) have been met, section
7(c) stated that the Commission was authorized to issue licenses
for such uses on a "non-exclusive basis," subject to the limitation
that:
... Where activities under any license might
serve to maintain or to foster the growth of
monopoly, restraint of trade, unlawful com-
petition, or other trade position inimical to
the entry of new, freely competitive enter-
prises in the field, the Commission is author-
ized and directed to refuse to issue such li-
cense or to establish such conditions to pre-
vent these results as the Commission, in con-
sultation with the Attorney General, may de-
termine. The Commission shall report
promptly to the Attorney General any in-
formation it may have with respect to any
utilization of fissionable material or atomic
energy which appears to have these re-
sults .... 28
-42 U.S.C. § 1808 (1946).
2642 U.S.C. § 1807 (1946).
2742 U.S.C. § 1807 (1946).
28Section 7 states further:
(c) Issuance of Licenses.-After such ninety-day peri-
od, unless hereafter prohibited by law, the Commission
may license such manufacture, production, export, or use
in accordance with such procedures and subject to such
conditions as it may be by regulations establish to
effectuate the provisions of this Act. The Commission is
authorized and directed to issue licenses on a nonexclu-
sive basis and to supply to the extent available appro-
priate quantities of fissionable material to licensees (1)
whose proposed activities will serve some useful purpose
proportionate to the quantities of fissionable material to
be consumed; (2) who are equipped to observe such
safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger
from explosion or other hazard to life or property as the
May 1970]
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Possible monopolistic control of a revolutionary application of
atomic energy was the underlying motivation of the licensing
restrictions of Section 7:
The counterapproach to free enterprise was
to inhibit monopolies. Specifically, this meant
keeping Manhattan District contractors from
cornering atomic energy technology and ex-
ploiting its civilian uses. Newman and Miller
had criticized the May-Johnson bill for pro-
viding inadequate protection against this
threat. They had emphasized the antimo-
nopoly theme in drafting the McMahon bill,
and no member of the committee had yet
objected publicly to this feature.
What stirred the committee, however, to
advocate unprecedented Government in-
tervention in the economic process was the
anticipation of substantial if not spectacular
innovations in nonmilitary uses of atomic
energy... Who would be sure that someone
would not invent a pill which could be
dropped in a pail of water to heat a house or
even a community for a year? Could the
Government permit such a revolutionary in-
vention to remain in the hands of a single
individual or company....
Section 7 clearly reflected the "pill in the
pail" philosophy. Basically, the section pro-
hibited manufacturing or operating any de-
Commission may establish; and (3) who agree to make
available to the Commission such technical information
and data concerning their activities pursuant to such
licenses as the Commission may determine necessary to
encourage similar activities by as many licensees as pos-
sible. Each such license shall be issued for a specified
period, shall be revocable at any time by the Commission
in accordance with such procedures as the Commission
may establish, and may be renewed upon the expiration
of such period. ...
No license may be given to any person for activities
which are not under or within the jurisdiction of the
United States, to any foreign government, or to any
person within the United States if, in the opinion of the
Commission, the issuance of a license to such person
would be inimical to the common defense and security.
42 U.S.C. § 1807 (1946).
[Vol. 3:2
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vice utilizing atomic energy or fissionable ma-
terial without a license from the Commission.
To this provision, Newman and Miller at-
tached two long paragraphs describing the
procedures for licensing civilian uses [section
7(b) procedural prerequisities] .... In case
someone contrived a "pill in the pail" in-
vention, Congress would presumably have
time to pass appropriate legislation before the
Commission issues a license. 29 [Emphasis
added].
Moreover, since the production of electrical power through
nuclear reactors was deemed in 1946, and for a number of years
thereafter, to be a use of atomic energy that could not be li-
censed, sections 7(b) and 7(c) of the 1946 Act related only to
other peaceful uses of atomic energy. In light of the prohibition
on the licensing of electrical power uses and the safeguards of
section 7 (b), the remarkable feature of the 1946 Act was that it
contained any provisions relating to monopoly.30 In light of the
extremely narrow area of possible private participation, the mea-
sures in the 1946 Act to prevent the monopoly "had a fairly
hollow ring.'' 3 '
29R. HEWLETT, supra note 5, at 494-5.
As noted, these provisions were largely the result of the broad gauged creative
approach of specific individuals such as Benjamin V. Cohen and James R. Newman,
whose span of vision sought to comprehend the total impact of nuclear fission on
world developments.
The firms that had responsibility for managing the various nuclear installations
(Los Alamos, Hanford, Oak Ridge) which resulted in the development of the atomic
bomb were figuratively known as the Manhattan District Contractors. These firms
included General Electric, Westinghouse, Allied Chemical, Union Carbide and
others.3 When atomic fission flashed on the world in 1945, at
Hiroshima, atomic energy production facilities and
all of its potential peacetime uses were both a war-
time military secret and a government monopoly.
Their transfer to civilian control in the McMahon
Act of 1946 ... with a Civilian Atomic Energy
Commission ... large preserved the government
monopoly in what has been described as an "island
of socialism" from most parts of which private en-
terprise was excluded.311d. at 103.
May 19701
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B. The 1954 Act
1. Licensing Considerations
On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower, in a speech to
the General Assembly of the United Nations, made it clear that
the United States was embarking on policies which would result
in declassifying much information concerning nuclear fission and
in encouraging participation of private industry in the future de-
velopment of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.32 Significantly,
many large corporations that had supplied materials and services
to the classified military programs of the United States Govern-
ment, had, by late 1953, developed expertise which would be
used when the production of electric power by the utilization of
nuclear fuels was opened to private industry.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 constituted the main legisla-
tive effort to modify and diminish the controls on private industry
to make possible a large nuclear development program. This
article, as stated, is concerned only with those provisions of the
1946 and 1954 Acts which relate to the subject of monopoly.
Sections 7(b) and 7(c) of the 1946 Act evolved into section 102
(Finding of Practical Value), section 103 (Commercial Licenses),
section 104 (Medical Therapy and Research and Development),
and section 105 (Antitrust Provisions) of the 1954 Act.
a. Section 102
Section 102 introduces into the 1954 Act the phrase "practical
value" 33 which was used in section 7(b) of the 1946 Act. How-
ever, section 102 calls for a finding of practical value by the AEC
whenever a "type of utilization or production facility has been
sufficiently developed to be of practical value for industrial or
commercial purposes."'34 [Emphasis added] As pointed out pre-
viously, this type of facility could not have been the subject of a
3 2Address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, Dec. 8, 1953. THE ATOM FOR PROGRESS AND PEACE (Department of
State Pub. No. 5403, General Foreign Policy Series No. 88, 1953).
3342 U.S.C. § 2132 (1954).
[Vol. 3.:2
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determination of value under the 1946 Act since that Act prohib-
ited the licensing of such facilities. 3 5 Furthermore, the require-
ment of a finding of practical value under the 1954 Act is confined
to the uses which would require facility licenses.
By 1954, it had become clear that "production and utilization
facilities"36 would not constitute sufficiently dangerous uses so
that government ownership would be required. Nevertheless,
such uses of atomic energy would still require the somewhat less
complex facility licensing procedures prescribed by the 1954 Act
which were designed to assure full consideration of health, safety,
and national security problems. This change in policy led to the
gradual abandonment between 1952 and 1954 of the Baruch
proposals3 7 in the field of international arms controlP8
b. Sections 103 and 104
Section 103 furnishes the procedures for commercial licenses
after a finding of practical value, while section 104 provides
somewhat simpler procedures for licenses in medical therapy and
in the conduct of research and development
activities leading to the demonstration of
practical value of facilities for industrial or
commercial purposes, and in the conduct of
certain types of research and development
activities.3 9
Under the 1946 Act, it would probably not have been possible to
license any of the activities which can be licensed under sections
103 and 104 of the 1954 Act. The most important difference
between the procedures under section 103 and those under sec-
tion 104 is that, under the latter, the AEC's primary consideration
is whether the granting of a license would promote the common
defense and security and protect the health and safety of the
35See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.36These facilities would include reactors as well as chemical processing plants and, for the
future, isotope separation plants, and possibly some type of fuel fabrication plants
utilizing highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
37B. BECHHOEFER, supra note 4.381d. at 215-9.
3942 U.S.C. § 2134(b) & (c) (1954).
May 1970]
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public. In addition, under section 104, the license should be
"compatible with the regulations and terms of license which
would apply in the event that a commercial license were later to
be issued pursuant to Section 103 for that type of facility." 40
In contrast, the license procedures of section 103 provide cer-
tain additional criteria, the most important of which is that the
proposed activity should "serve a useful purpose proportionate to
quantities of special nuclear material or source material to be
utilized." 41 As is pointed out in the Statesville decision, 42 this
guideline rested upon a distinction between commercial licenses
(§ 103) and research and demonstration licenses (§ 104) which
has "ceased to be realistic. The fuel supplies so jealously guarded
in the past have been found to be relatively abundant. '43
2. Monopoly Considerations: Section 105
When the differentiation between commercial projects and re-
search and demonstration projects largely disappeared with the
discovery of abundant fissionable material, the sole remaining
distinction between the two types of licenses rested in the
different procedures for dealing with questions of monopoly. Sec-
tion 105(a) specifically affirms the applicability of the various
antitrust laws to the field of atomic energy. This result may have
been implicit in the 1946 Act, but only in the 1954 Act was the
specific provision included. Section 105 (b) requires the Commis-
sion to "report promptly to the Attorney General any information
which it may have with respect to any utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy which appears to violate or
tend towards a violation of Congressional Acts governing mo-
nopoly," or to restrict free competition in private enterprise. 44
4042 U.S.C. § 2134 (1954).
41 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1954). The implication of section 103 was that competitive hearings
would be held among applicants for power reactors to determine which projects
would be most useful to the public in relation to the amounts of fissionable material
required and which applicants should thus be permitted to utilize the limited supplies.42 City of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 38 U.S.L.W. 2326.
4338 U.S.L.W., at 2326.
4442 U.S.C. § 2135 (b) (1954). In the scope of the requirement to report such conditions,
section 105(b) roughly parallels section 7(b) of the 1946 Act which provides for
comprehensive reports from the Commission to the President, and from the president
to the Congress, of the "social, political, economic, and international effects" of the
uses of atomic energy. 42 U.S.C. § 1807 (1946).
[Vol. 3:2
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This requirement extends to all uses of atomic energy: those
licensed under sections 103 and 104 as well as those which may
require material licenses or no licenses at all.
Section 105(c) has no parallel in the earlier Act. This provision
requires the Commission, before it issues any commercial license,
to "notify the Attorney General of the proposed license and the
proposed terms and conditions thereof, except such classes or
types of licenses as the Commission, with the approval of the
Attorney General, may determine.., would not significantly
affect the licensee's activities under the anti-trust law. . . -45 The
Attorney General, within a reasonable time not exceeding ninety
(90) days, "shall advise the Commission whether insofar as he
can determine, the proposed license will tend to create or main-
tain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws, and such
advice will be published in the Federal Register." 46
This provision differs in substance from section 7(c) of the
1946 Act in at least two respects. First, the requirement of
mandatory referral to the Attorney General applies only to sec-
tion 103 licenses. This limitation, however, does not prevent the
Commission from referring research and demonstration (§ 104) li-
censes to the Attorney General under section 105(b). Indeed,
section 105(b) places a duty on the Commission to report any
information attendant to section 104 license applications to the
Attorney General if it appears to violate, or tend toward the
violation of, any of the acts, or to restrict free competition in
private enterprise. 47
Far greater legal problems are created by the second substan-
tive difference between sections 7(c) and 105(c). 4 8 While not
4542 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1954).
4642 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1954).
4 7The Commission has on one occasion referred problems arising in section 104 cases to
the Attorney General. Letter from William H. Orrick, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Antitrust Division, Justice Department, to John F. Hennessey, General Counsel,
Atomic Energy Commission, Aug. 9, 1963, introduced in Hearings on Chemical
Reprocessing Plants Before the Gov't Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., ist
Sess., at 55 (1963). The Attorney General concluded that the arrangements "should
not be deemed unpermissible from the standpoint of antitrust law." Competition in
the Nuclear Power Supply Industry, Atomic Energy Commission report prepared by
Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1969, United States Government Printing Office, in Annex C
[hereinafter cited as LITTLE REPORT]. In the Statesville case,.supra note 1, the Court
points out that the Justice Department was "on the briefs" and therefore had ample
knowledge
4 8See § 7(c) in text accompanying note 28 supra.
May 1970].
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completely free of ambiguity, the mandate of section 7(c) is com-
paratively straightforward; if the Attorney General made an ad-
verse finding, the Commission was to refuse the license. In con-
trast, section 105(c) does not stipulate what action is to be taken
by the Commission after an adverse ruling on a monopoly ques-
tion by the Attorney General in response to either a mandatory
request under section 103, or to a voluntary request under section
104. 49 This legislative system has spawned a series of problems,
most of which Mr. Austern foresaw in his 1955 article. 50 If the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department makes an adverse
ruling concerning a commercial (§ 103) license application, it is
unclear whether the Commission is required to reject the license
application, or whether it may determine that the benefits arising
from the facility override the antitrust considerations. Further-
more, if the Attorney General's ruling is ambiguous, it is unclear
what action the Commission is to take. This also poses a problem
for the applicant. It is unclear whether the applicant, as a prac-
tical matter, will be in a position to proceed with the construction
of the facility after an ambiguous response from the Justice De-
partment in light of the fact that the Commission's construction
permit and license would not protect the applicant from legal
action brought by other government agencies.
Finally, in a section 104 license application, if the Justice
Department advises the Commission that the license might tend
to create or maintain a situation in violation of the antitrust laws,
it is unclear whether the Commission must refuse to issue the
license on this ground, or whether it could ignore the advice
entirely.
As will be pointed out, these ambiguities came before the court
in the Statesville litigation. Before embarking on further analysis
of these issues, however, it is essential to mention some of the
main industrial developments in the field of atomic energy since
1954 and their monopolistic implications.
49 1t is clear from the legislative history of this provision that the omission was deliberate.
Senator Hubert Humphrey had proposed, and the Senate had accepted, an amend-
ment which would have made the advice of the Attorney General binding upon the
AEC. The Conference Committee rejected this amendment because the Attorney
General's advice became a decision binding upon both the Commission and the
applicant without a hearing. See AUSTERN, supra note 30, and City of Statesville v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 38 U.S.L.W. 2326.
50AUSTERN, supra note 30.
[Vol. 3:2
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III. Post-1954 Monopoly Developments in the Nuclear Industry
A. The Events
In December 1968, the results of a study [the Little Report]
commissioned by the Federal Government entitled "Competition
in the Nuclear Power Supply Industry" were presented to the
United States Atomic Energy Commission and to the United
States Department of Justice.51 In order to clarify the issues
raised in the first legal treatments of the problems of monopoly in
the nuclear industry, it seems desirable to describe the chief areas
in which monopoly problems have arisen since 1954 and the
administrative action taken to deal with them.5 2
The confinement of the Little Report to the nuclear power
supply industry reflected the fact that substantially all, if not all,
of the problems of monopoly in the nuclear field have arisen in
that particular segment of the industry. This fact confirms, to a
certain extent, some of the predictions made prior to enactment of
the 1946 Act when there was no nuclear industry. As mentioned
above, two areas where monopoly might develop had been early
recognized: "pill in the pail" (where an unanticipated break-
through might revolutionize living conditions), and "Manhattan
District Contractors ... cornering atomic technology." 53 The for-
mer possibility has not occurred. On the other hand, most of the
potential monopoly situations dealt with by the Little Report
arose from the vast research efforts of various companies into the
use of nuclear energy.
Even before enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it
became apparent that immediately after the Act's passage private
industry would be supplying small reactors for research purposes,
somewhat larger reactors for materials testing, and, a few years
later, large reactors to produce electric power. This development
would require the participation of private industry both in manu-
facturing reactors and in other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. 54
5 1 LITTLE REPORT, supra note 47.5 2It is not feasible in this article to abstract the findings and conclusions of the LITTLE
REPORT, since they are based on a technical analysis of the fuel cycle, and even in
summary form would be twice the length of this article.53See text accompanying note 29 supra.54These additional stages included mining uranium for fuel elements; fabrication of the fuel
elements; in the future, chemical processing, of spent fuel elements; and still
further in the future, enrichment of the uranium incorporated into the fuel elements.
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It was clear, even in 1954, that for at least the next decade, an
overwhelming proportion of the power industry's expenditures
would be for the purchase of reactors. The fuel itself was still
leased from the AEC. Its conversion into the form required for
fuel elements, fabrication of the fuel elements, and the various
engineering and other services required to install the nuclear
plants, while calling for substantial expenditures, would never-
theless involve relatively small sums in comparison to the cost of
the reactors. Therefore, the critical line in monopoly depended
upon competition in the manufacture of reactors.
Prior to 1954, a substantial number of companies headed by
the "Manhattan District Contractors" had obtained to a certain
degree the expertise required to manufacture nuclear reactors as a
result of their contracts with the United States Government.
Partly as a deliberate government policy, and partly through bu-
reaucratic inertia, multiple sources of reactor supply continued
after the time when limitations on the number of suppliers might
have produced lower prices and more efficient production. For
example, in 1954, some ten companies were capable of manufac-
turing small research reactors and possibly the considerably lar-
ger materials-testing reactors, which were the earliest commercial
reactors. 55 When a market developed in the 1960's for the larger
power reactors, however, most of these companies found that
they were unable to compete. In 1963, General Electric con-
tracted to supply to Jersey Central Power and Light Co. with a
large power reactor which, without any research support from the
Federal Government, was to produce power at a price com-
petitive with conventional fuels. Indeed, by 1963, many utility
companies began to plan power projects. Two types of light water
reactors, both using low enriched uranium, had by that time
proved feasible: boiling water reactors constructed by General
Electric and pressurized water reactors constructed by West-
inghouse Electric. These light water reactors possessed character-
istics which made them more desirable than other types of reac-
tors. From 1963 to 1965, other companies seeking to break into
the nuclear reactor market were unable to match the terms
offered by General Electric and Westinghouse Electric.5 6 Thus it
5 5 DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISION, THE NUCLE-
AR INDUSTRY 17 (1969).5 61d. at 131.
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appeared likely that the manufacture of power reactors would
become a duopoly shared by these two corporate giants. This did
not occur, however, primarily because the demand for light water
reactors was so great that General Electric and Westinghouse
were simply unable to fill all the orders. As a result, in 1966 and
1967, other companies received orders for a substantial number
of reactors. 57
In 1968 and 1969, however, orders for light water reactors
diminished, largely because of delays encountered in their licens-
ing and construction. The power companies could not afford such
delays in light of the rapid increase in demand for power caused
by the growing urban areas. Furthermore, technological improve-
ments in fossil fuel power plants resulting from intensified com-
petition between the suppliers of nuclear power and coal contrib-
uted to this downturn in demand. During this period, as the
orders for General Electric and Westinghouse reactors slackened,
the orders for other companies' reactors virtually disappeared. 58
This market change raises the possibility that the competitive
situation will again deteriorate from oligopoly to duopoly in the
near future. This possibility, however, is not particularly alarming
since the light water reactors will gradually be replaced by more
advanced reactors that should provide cheaper nuclear power and
that should use less uranium in the process.
The Atomic Energy Commission has encouraged and contrib-
uted financially to several extensive research programs designed
to speed the development of both advanced converters and breed-
er reactors. The great cost of these research programs, as well as
their technological problems, makes it essential that potential
competitors participate at an early stage in these research pro-
grams in order to acquire the expertise necessary to compete.
Initially, only General Electric was developing the breeder reac-
tor. The AEC, in order to avoid a monopoly situation, has assist-
ed four major research programs developed by private industry
and a fifth in Commission laboratories. Thus, through adminis-
trative action, the Atomic Energy Commission has sought to
insure that no one or even two companies shall dominate the
business of manufacturing nuclear power reactors.
57 Babcock & Wilcox Company received orders for three reactors in 1966 and five in 1967.
Combustion Engineering Company received one order in 1966 and five in 1967.




B. Analysis of the Developments
One dangerous side-effect of the development of monopoly or
duopoly in the manufacture of reactors is that these manufac-
turers would be able to eliminate competition in other areas of the
fuel cycle through vertical integration. For example, General
Electric and Westinghouse Electric became the chief customers
for fuel elements. If they supplied their own initial fuel elements,
however, the other suppliers, some ten in number, would be left
with very few customers. Moreover, if General Electric and
Westinghouse succeeded in supplying users with fuel loadings
subsequent to those required to commence reactor operations, the
other suppliers would be largely excluded from the supply mar-
ket. They could further discourage the competition of in-
dependent suppliers by terminating the warranties on the initial
loading if a customer-power company contracted to purchase the
second load from an independent contractor. Similarly, General
Electric or Westinghouse, by entering the field of chemical pro-
cessing of spent fuel elements and simultaneously embarking on a
policy of "cradle to grave" contracts furnishing the fuel elements
and reprocessing services as well as the reactors, could leave only
a very small market for independent chemical reprocessors. Thus,
the dominant position of the two chief suppliers of reactors led to
the clear possibility of monopolistic development through vertical
integration. This vertical integration was further encouraged by
the comparative financial weakness of many of the suppliers of
the auxiliary services and materials.
The Little Report pointed out two ways to combat this danger:
(1) strengthening the independent suppliers by permitting them to
integrate vertically; and (2) preventing vertical integration by the
large suppliers of reactors by prohibiting expansion, at least
through merger, into other areas of the fuel cycle. These methods
have, in fact, been employed, partly by design and partly because
of the financial needs of the smaller suppliers. A number of the
large petroleum companies, 59 initially interested solely in the pro-
duction and supply of uranium, have expanded their facilities
mainly through mergers to other phases of the fuel cycle including




the manufacture of reactors.60 All of these companies have
adequate resources to compete successfully with the two giant
manufacturers of reactors, and thus they provide a potential
check on the expansion of General Electric and Westinghouse.
Moreover, the Antitrust Division has not, to date, opposed this
type of vertical integration.
The first instance of vertical integration in which the Justice
Department did raise objections resulted from an attempt by
Combustion Engineering, one of the smaller reactor manufac-
turers, to take over United Nuclear Company, one of the few
independent suppliers of fuel elements that currently has orders
from the utilities, through a tender offer. 61 It is entirely possible
that a merger of United Nuclear and Combustion Engineering
would have increased, rather than diminished, competition since
Combustion Engineering has only a small percentage of the reac-
tor business and does not appear to be a prospective supplier of
the next, and more advanced, generation of reactors. However,
allowance of such a merger would have breached the Federal
Government's policy of preventing monopolistic or duopolistic
development in the reactor industry through prohibition of ex-
pansion of reactor manufacturers into other phases of the fuel
cycle. Accordingly, the takeover bid was frustrated, and the
merger fell through.
A potential monopoly arose when the AEC entered into a fuel
load contract with Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.(NFS)6 2 to supply
government fuel for reprocessing in the first commercial chemical
processing plant. The Commission was fully aware that NFS
would have a monopoly until the construction of other chemical
processing plants created a sufficient demand for additional sup-
pliers. When NFS received its construction permit in 1963, the
commercial load was insufficient to justify commercial processing.
Therefore, the Commission furnished government fuel load to
NFS and inserted complex terms in its contract to assure that
NFS would furnish services on a nondiscriminatory basis to any
60LITTLE REPORT, supra 47, at 70.
6 1United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Engineering Co. (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D.Pa., Case




commerical customer and that NFS would not realize undue
profits. As a result, NFS has had a limit on its earnings during the
period of the contract, like a public utility. Unlike a public utility,
however, it has had no assurance of a rate which would permit a
reasonable return on its investment. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion, in awarding the fuel load to NFS, specifically set aside an
equal amount of fuel load which could be furnished to a com-
petitor if such competitor should appear on the scene. The Com-
mission brought these arrangements to the attention of the Justice
Department pursuant to section 105(c) of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, and the Justice Department rendered an opinion that
the fuel load contract with NFS "should not be deemed imper-
missible from the standpoint of antitrust law or policy." 63 In light
of the safeguards taken by the Commission, this opinion is not
surprising. In fact, the Commission has found it unnecessary to
furnish a government fuel load contract for any competitors of
NFS since General Electric, Allied Chemical, and Atlantic Rich-
field subsequently decided to enter the field without such support,
even though for the next few years substantial losses seem cer-
tain, and even though the potential capacity of these three plants
plus that of NFS far exceeds the materials available for process-
ing.
Thus, in the sixteen years since 1954, the nuclear power supply
industry has produced a number of situations which might have
led to monopoly. Moreover, the vast sums of money required to
participate in the important phases of the industry will continue to
limit the number of participating commercial firms. Maximum
competition will arise only through an oligopoly structure of the
industry rather than a monopoly or duopoly structure. Both the
Justice Department and the AEC have recognized this and have
walked a tightrope to encourage the development within the in-
dustry of six or seven competitors with large capital resources.
This has been accomplished primarily by spreading research and
other benefits among a number of companies, and by allowing
vertical integration except where a reactor manufacturer wished
to combine with a company participating in some other area of
the nuclear fuel cycle.
63Letter from William H. Orrick, Jr., supra note 47.
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IV. Monopoly Regulation Under the 1954 Act
A. Judicial Challenge ofA EC Antitrust Power
In the latter part of 1966 and in the early part of 1967, three
separate groups of municipal power plants sought to participate in
the ownership of large nuclear power plants for which privately
owned power companies were requesting facility licenses from
the AEC. Certain North Carolina municipalities intervened in the
application of Duke Power Company for a facility license (the
Statesville case), the Power Planning Committee of the Mas-
sachusetts Electrical Association and others attempted to in-
tervene in the application of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation for a facility license (the Massachusetts Municipality
case), and certain Pennsylvania municipalities attempted to in-
tervene in the case of Philadelphia Electric Company. The mo-
nopoly issue in all three cases had its origin in the sudden realiza-
tion by the municipal power plants that, despite their tax advan-
tages and their low cost borrowing, they could not compete with
the huge nuclear or fossil fuel power plants which would be
constructed in increasing numbers in the late sixties.64 All three
cases utimately came on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The petition to review the
AEC order in the Philadelphia Electric case was dismissed on
February 10, 1970 on purely procedural grounds not involving
antitrust problems. 65 The petitions to review the orders of the
AEC in the Statesville and Massachusetts Municipal Electric
cases were denied by the court in a joint decision rendered on
December 5, 1969.66 The court did not premise its holding on
antitrust grounds, but the majority and concurring opinions raised
the entire problem of the respective responsibilities of the AEC,
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and other
agencies enforcing federal laws against monopoly in the nuclear
64The only relationship of this development to atomic energy was that the first huge plants
with extremely low power costs utilized nuclear fuels. The development of huge
power plants utilizing fossil fuels with analogous cost savings took place subsequently
as the results of the competition between nuclear and fossil fuels. It must be empha-
sized, however, that size and not nuclear fuel created this problem.
6Easton Utility Companies v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, I CCH 1970 ATOMIC ENERGY
LAW REP. 3577 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1970).
66City of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 38 U.S.L.W. at 2326.
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field.8 7 The court was, in effect, seeking to guide the AEC in its
future procedures. 68 The majority opinion, both concurring opin-
ions, and even the partial dissent agreed that their decision would
not necessarily prevent the municipal power plants from raising
antitrust questions in other contexts, such as those situations in
which the power company obtained its operating commercial li-
cense under section 103.
The analysis of the respective responsibilities in the nuclear
energy monopoly field of the AEC and the Justice Department in
the Statesville decision necessarily requires an examination of the
Congressional intent regarding the AEC's discretionary powers
under sections 103 and 104.69
A noteworthy feature in the municipalities cases resulted from
a misinterpretation of sections 102 and 103. The attorneys for the
municipalities apparently concluded that the competitive hearing
prescribed by section 103 had some relation to the problem of
monopoly and would result in full hearings on this matter. This
misconception led to their contention that the AEC was required
to proceed under section 103, and that it lacked jurisdiction to
issue a construction permit to the Duke Power Company under
section 104. However, as the court subsequently pointed out in
the Statesville and Massachusetts Municipalities cases, 70 the pur-
pose of the competitive hearings was to provide a proper alloca-
tion of uranium and, when it became apparent that the uranium
sources were not limited, the competitive hearing's purpose dis-
appeared although the requirement continued. The AEC's posi-
67See AUSTERN, supra note 30. These issues were the same ones raised by Austern earlier
in his article.
"
8For a thorough analysis of the factual situations coming before the Court, including the
practical problems of sharing power with municipalities, see Horn & Grigg, Antitrust
Aspects of Atomic Power Licensing Proceedings, ABA ANNUAL REPORT SECTION
OF PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 1968, at 72.
91f a hearing on the antitrust issues had taken place in either the Statesville or Massachu-
setts Municipalities cases, none of the economic data would have had any relation-
ship to the economic problems of the nuclear industry. The issues would have
related to the larger problem of bringing the economics of large-scale nuclear and
fossil generators to the small distribution systems. This is the type of problem usually
dealt with by Federal and State Power Commissions. Id. at 83. In contrast, the full
scale hearing on monopoly issues which might have arisen from the licensing of
General Electric's chemical processing plant would have produced economic data on
problems familar to the Commission, such as the effects of vertical integration on
competition in other phases of the fuel cycle.7 0City of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 38 U.S.L.W. 2326.
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tion was that section 104, rather than 103, applied to this case
because no demonstration of the practical value of the nuclear
power facilities for industrial or commercial purposes had been
made, and the court agreed with this position.
An implausible feature of the cases stemmed from the fact that
these interventions coincided with a broad campaign to subject
nuclear power to certain limitations relating to thermal pollution
which were not applicable to power plants utilizing fossil fuels.
The Massachusetts Municipalities cases in their earlier stages
raised not only the problem of monopoly, but also the question of
thermal pollution. The AEC took the position that it had no
jurisdiction to pass on the question of thermal pollution. 71 Re-
gardless of whether the Commission was correct in so limiting its
own jurisdiction in this situation, a different decision would have
unquestionably imposed requirements upon nuclear power pro-
jects that could not be imposed on fossil fuel projects.72
As well as taking the position that it lacked jurisdiction over
the thermal pollution issue, the AEC also ruled that it had no
authority to consider possible antitrust violations when granting a
section 104(b) license as was involved in this case. The
misconceptions and implausible aspects of this case may partially
explain the extraordinary limitations which the AEC imposed on
its own jurisdiction and may furnish the rationale for the court's
thorough consideration of the respective responsibilities between
the AEC and the various government agencies, particularly the
Justice Department.
B. Alternative Courses for Regulating Monopoly
The AEC's self-imposed jurisdictional limitations concerning
antitrust matters should be viewed in light of the alternative
courses for regulating monopoly in the nuclear field which con-
fronted the Congress in 1954 and which remain relevant both in
7 1For a contemporary position by the Commission on the question of radiological safety,
see New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170 (1969), cert.
denied 395 U.S. 962 (1969).72Theoretically, the municipalities might have raised the monopoly problem against either
nuclear facilities or facilities utilzing fossil fuels through the courts, the Department
of Justice, or the Federal Trade Commission. It was far simpler procedurally to seek
to intervene in a license application pending in the Atomic Energy Commission.
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the interpretation of existing law and in any pattern for future
legislation.
The first alternative would have been to give the AEC "com-
plete and continuing authority to safeguard against.., insistent
antitrust apprehensions." 7 3 [Emphasis added] If this course had
been followed, the decision of the AEC to grant a facility license
would have fully protected the applicant from actions based on
antitrust considerations by other branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment.7 4 It is clear that the Congress did not wish to give the
AEC such authority since it specifically provided for the applic-
ability of all antitrust legislation to the atomic energy industry,
including the right of Government agencies having jurisdiction to
proceed against violators in the nuclear field. It is logical to
expect that the Congress will not reverse this position since a
large portion of the problems of monopoly in the nuclear field
parallel the problems outside that field where uniform treatment
seems desirable.
The second and diametrically opposite course of action would
have been for Congress to make clear that:
anti-trust considerations were not directly in-
volved in atomic energy licensing and that the
license should have afforded no protection
against anti-trust prosecution or suits by the
Attorney General or by a private party. In
that event, conventional anti-trust rules
would be applied by the Courts. 75
It seems clear that the Act of 1954 cannot be so construed since
such an interpretation would require the AEC to issue a license
pursuant to a section 103 application even if the Attorney Gener-
al rendered an opinion that the license "would tend to create or
maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust law." 76 This
result seems inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
which, by implication, narrowly restricts any discretion which the
AEC would possess concerning the issuance of a section 103
license because of the mandatory referral provision. It also seems
73 AUSTERN, supra note 30, at 7.
74 A number of administrative agencies do possess this authority: Civil Aeronautics Board,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1382 (1958); Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C.
§ 222(b)(1) (1960); Federal Maritime Board, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1950).
75 AUSTERN, supra note 30, at 7.
7842 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(1954).
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undesirable from the standpoint of the nuclear industry because
of the uncertainty of constructing a nuclear plant without final
approval from the Justice Department.
Since both extreme solutions can therefore be rejected, it ap-
pears that Congress has apportioned jurisdiction over antitrust
problems in the nuclear field between the AEC and other
agencies involved in enforcing antitrust laws. Two questions are:
where has the split taken place, and where should that split take
place?
The 1946 Act required the AEC to deny a license if the
Attorney General's opinion on the question of monopoly was
unfavorable to the applicant. An amendment to the 1954 Act that
would have placed this same duty on the AEC was defeated. It is
clear that Congress declined to include such a provision in the
1954 Act because the result would give the Attorney General
final authority to act as both judge and jury in deciding whether
the license should be granted or denied. 77 It follows that the
Commission presumably has greater discretion under the 1954
Act than it had under the 1946 Act. If the Commission does have
discretion to grant, deny or impose conditions on a commercial
license after an unfavorable ruling from the Justice Department
concerning antitrust matters, a public hearing on monopoly is-
sues before the Licensing Board of the AEC seems to be avail-
able since that would be the only method by which the Licensing
Boards could exercise their discretion. Thus it seems that the
AEC does have authority to consider antitrust violations under
section 103 license proceedings.
The above analysis relates to section 103 rather than to section
104 cases. However, it is difficult to differentiate between these
sections. The sole distinction between section 103 situations and
section 104 situations is that reference to the Justice Department
for an opinion on antitrust problems is mandatory under section
103 and is optional under section 104. Therefore, the discretion
under the latter section is arguably greater than under section
103. However, Assistant Attorney General Zimmerman, in testi-
mony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Con-
gress, pointed out that if the Justice Department rendered an
77AUSTERN, supra note 30, at 9.
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opinion in a section 104 case that the granting of the license or
construction permit would tend to create or maintain a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws, he did not anticipate that the
Commission would regard such an opinion as "light reading." The
Justice Department seems to take the position that, although the
AEC has some discretion concerning antitrust considerations in
a section 104 application, the AEC had best pay heed to the
Justice Department's recommendation.
In the municipal cases, the majority opinion of the court sup-
ported the AEC position that it has no authority under the 1954
Act to consider monopoly problems in connection with section
104 licenses. The concurring opinion of Judge Leventhal in
Statesville is to the contrary. Both the majority opinion and the
concurring opinion recognize that the decision at the construction
permit state does not preclude antitrust questions being raised at
the licensing stage by the Justice Department or others. The
probabilities are that, in the absence of legislation, there will be a
finding of practical value prior to the time that either Duke Power
or Vermont Yankee are ready to obtain their licenses, and there-
fore a finding that they will receive section 103 licenses. Since the
Attorney General's response at that time to the mandatory sec-
tion 103 antitrust question might well be "perhaps," it is in the
licensees' interest that the Commission prescribe in the license a
series of conditions which would satisfy the Commission itself,
the Justice Department, and the applicant. Such a policy would
obviously depend upon a hearing by the Licensing Board on
monopoly questions broader in scope than that contemplated by
the AEC in its interpretation of its discretionary powers under
sections 103 and 104.
V. Conclusion
The Commission has pursued a consistent policy of limiting the
subject matter of hearings before a licensing board to matters
which pertain to its role as the agency responsible for the devel-
opoment of atomic energy and in which it can furnish the ex-
pertise required to support the decision. A broadening of the
scope of the issues to include, for example, a consideration of
antitrust questions seems inevitable.
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The recently enacted National Environmental Policy Act7 8 may
provide a means for this expansion of scope. The Policy Act
establishes a policy which would require the Commission to con-
sider a number of issues in its licensing proceedings, such as
thermal pollution, that go beyond radiological health and safety.
By analogy, this might provide a basis for the AEC likewise to
consider antitrust issues similar to those in the Statesville case. If
the National Environmental Policy Act cannot be construed to
furnish the Commission the authority to consider these issues, the
Commission is required to propose further legislation which will
give it such authority. The broadening of the issues that the
Commission will consider must necessarily result in adminis-
trative changes which should give the licensing boards the capa-
bility of passing on questions beyond radiological health and
safety and national security. However, it is beyond the scope of
this article to consider the specific administrative steps inherent in
this extension of the scope of the licensing provisions. These
administrative steps might include a determination of whether the
licensing function of the AEC should be turned over to a separate
organization with no other functions in the field of atomic energy;
how to establish parallel procedures for dealing with analogous
problems not involving atomic energy; the exact limitations of the
Commission's authority in such broadened hearings; and the pos-
sible changes in the expertise of the members of the licensing
boards. 79
It therefore seems likely that the licensing procedure will in-
clude a full hearing on monopoly questions, whether the ex-
pansion of the hearings' scope be the result of judicial in-
terpretation of the existing Act or of additional legislation. It
appears that the achievement of a practical solution of antitrust
problems in atomic energy has become too closely linked with
related issues, such as thermal pollution and the necessity of
7833 U.S.C. § 3466(h)(Supp. 1970).
79 One possibility which deserves serious consideration for limiting the scope of the
hearings would be to require a Commission hearing on monopoly problems only at
the initiative of the Department of Justice. This might prevent undue delays in the
licensing procedures without in any way interfering with the opportunity of the
Government or any aggrieved group to have their day in Court. The recourse of the
aggrieved groups would be to the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission.
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expeditious licensing proceedings to prevent prospective power
shortages, to permit the resolution of the procedural problems
through the leisurely process of judicial interpretation. The Com-
mission has already suggested some amendments to sections 102,
103, and 104. Hopefully, the Congress will also amend section
105 to provide this essential reform.
